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Some Problems In Partnership
Restated
Prolegomena
Partnership has been termed "a commercial adventure." The elementary principles applying to this subject
at common law are neither difficult of comprehension nor
of application, provided there is maintained by the Courts
a clear idea as to the nature of the adventure. It is obvious that the organization of individuals dealing as partners is not a corporation and yet the trend of much authority has been in the direction of accrediting to such
an organization corporate attributes. To the earnest student groping his way through the decisions of the Courts
and the Acts of the Legislature in the effort to glean principles of partnership law, a chief difficulty encountered is
to determine through what theory the Courts or the Legislature are viewing the organization of partnership. Moreover, our Courts of Pennsylvania have not been consistent
in their expressions on this subject and reconciliation of
view is well nigh impossible.
Again as has been pointed out, the Uniform Partnership Act of 1915 is far from clear in its theory. This problem is concisely presented by Professor Edward H. Warren
in his recent work "Corporate Advantages without Incorporation" where at page 301 he says:
"The law becomes blurred and confused unless
Courts and Legislatures give a clear answer to this
question: Are partnership rights and obligations the
rights and obligations of the human beings who are
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the partners or are they the rights and obligations of
some other legal unit having its rights and obligations,
which are distinct from their rights and liabilities?"
The accepted characteristics of partnership are (1) the
ownership of the assets by the partners and (2) their unlimited liability for whatever debts are contracted in the
joint venture, Despite these obvious characteristics much
discussion has revolved around the nature of partnership,
and our first problem will be a restatement of this matter.
Nature of Partnership
In an article published in Dickinson Law Review,
March Number; 1916, the present writer stated the divergent views of the nature of partnership. They are three
in number, viz: The association theory; the entity theory;
and a third view offered by Professor James Parsons in his
Principles of Partnership at page 97 and known as the
status theory.
The prevailing view and the one followed at common
law is the association theory. The entity view is well expressed by our Mr. Justice Williams in Clark v. The Railroad Company, 136 Pa. 413, 1890, wherein he uttered this
dictum :
"The partnership when formed is a distinct person in
law. It has its own name, its own property, and a
right to contract, to sue and be sued, by its firm name."
This same view was expressed in 1829 by Chief Justice
Gibson in the leading case Doner v. Stauffer, 1 P. & W. 198,
when he declared:
"It is well settled by a train of decisions in the
American as well as the British Courts, that the joint
effects belong to the firm, and not to the partners."
These statements, coming from eminent authority,
have contributed not a little to a confusion that exists in
respect to the nature of partnership. They are misleading
and inaccurate as correct legal principles. The firm as a
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distinct entity or legal person has never been so recognized
in Pennsylvania Law. On the contrary, in every case where
the exact question was before the Courts, partners have
been recognized as the co-owners of assets held in partner
ship and on the other hand they are made responsible
personally for whatever obligations have been contracted
in pursuance of the joint venture.
Quoting from the article already referred to, the remaining view of the nature of partnership is thus expressed:
"A third view of the nature of a firm has been
offered by Professor Parsons in his Principles of Partnership. According to his views, partnership is a
status and in support of this view he presents the
following discussion:
"The sum of the rights and duties of the partners
in the relation is called the status of partnership. The
status may be created by contract, like marriage or
sale. The contract is the occasion or door, and the consummation or conveyance established rights in rem."
"Though partnership may be dissolved at will and the
relation brought to a close through the act of the individual, yet the status, with all its attendant duties and
prerogatives, subsists until it is terminated in a manner
consistent with its original purpose." "The elevation
of partnership into a status is due to the presence of a
firm estate." "The partners, being merged as individuals, in the firm estate, are enabled to trade in a distinct
capacity." "The only qualification is that in acting as
partners they bind their separate estates, and the firm
creditor is not confined to the firm fund." "It is the
recognition by the law of the estate that severs the
partner from himself as a man."
The above author rejects the mercantile or fiction
theory and queries:
"What is the polarity of mind of a lawyer who
advocates making a partnership by turns a corporation
and a number of individuals? If he comprehended the
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elemental distinction of kind, he.would not expose his
confusion by making the suggestion, but he would disguise the proposition in the jargon of lawyers who
speak of a man quo modo, a horse."
Referring to the first two theories Professor Warren
in his work at page 2 says:
"There are two theories as to the proper basis for
that law,-the entity theory and the aggregate theory.
The advocates of the entity theory urge that the partners should be considered to be merged into a composite unit, the partnership, which unit has a continuing identity and acquires its rights and incurs its obligations. The advocates of the aggregate theory, on
the other hand, urge that the partners should be considered as not merged into a composite unit, but as
so many individuals who acquire their joint rights and
incur their joint obligations."
To quote again from Professor Warren in explanation
of these two theories he states the following at page 35
of his work:
"Under the aggregate theory, an obligation incurred in the conduct of the partnership business is the
obligation of those persons who were partners at the
time the obligation was incurred. The partners are
liable, directly and primarily liable, and liable without
limit.
The advocates of the entity theory say that an
obligation incurred in the conduct of the partnership
business is incurred by it, the partnership,-that the
partnership is a legal unit and that the obligation is
its obligation. They then add that they do not mean
that the partners themselves should be protected from
liability.
Their position is therefore that, without legislative
sanction therefor, (1) the courts should treat a partnership as a legal unit; but then, (2) should provide
in some affirmative way that the members of this legal
unit shall not escape liability ........
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In what way do advocates of the entity theory
propose that the partners should be reached? Three
ways are thinkable:
a. The partners might be held to be under a liability to the partnership to supply it with funds sufficient to enable it to discharge its liabilities; this liability of the partners to the partnership would be one
of its assets, which its creditors could reach. Under
this conception, the creditors of the partnership will
reach the partners via the partnership and therefor(
the liability of the partners, from the point of view of
the creditors, is indirect and secondary.
b. The partners might be held to be liable as
sureties for it, the partnership. Under this conception,
the rights of the creditors will be directly against them,
the partners, as well as against it, the partnership, but
the liability of the partners to the creditors, although
direct, will be secondary.
c. It might be said that both it, the partnership,
and they, the partners, are liable. Under this conception, the rights of the creditors will be directly
against the partners as well as against it, the partnership, and the liability of the partners to the creditors
will be direct and primary. But the duty to pay will
not rest solely upon them; the duty to pay will be
shared by it."
As has already been stated the law of Pennsylvania
has never recognized the entity theory as such although
there does appear in many of the cases loose talk about the
partnership, its rights and obligations and frequently the
statement is made that the personal property belongs to
the firm and the title thereto can be transferred in the firm
name. On the other hand in treating of titles to real estate,
at least prior to the passage of the Uniform Partnership
Act, our cases have been uniform in holding that only the
partners could hold the title to real estate used for partnership purposes and the reason assigned has always been that
the firm had no legal recognition and could not per se be
the grantee of a legal title. In reference to suits by and
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against those acting as partners a practice has grown up
in the Pennsylvania cases permitting these suits to be
brought in the partnership name. An illustration of this
will be found in Tonge v. Item Publishing Company, 244 Pa.
425, 1914, where it was stated that from the time of early
decisions in Pennsylvania a suit might be maintained
against the partnership in the firm name only and without
naming the individual partners and that such a record
would support a verdict, judgment, and execution against
the partnership property as well as the individual property
of any partner who was actually served with process. But
such a judgment will not bind the individual estate of a
partner not served with a summons and consequently no
execution could issue against him. Other illustrations of
suits permitted in the partnership name are found in
O'Brien v. Saint Rita Oil Company, 4 D. & C. 640, 1924 and
Frisby Lumber Company v. Kratzer, et al, 6 D. & C. 295, 1924.
These cases, however, illustrate merely questions of procedure and do not affect the nature of the partnership
relation. Moreover, it is generally recognized as better
practice in actions by or against partners that they be so
named on the record as individuals, followed by a description of them trading as partners. 30 Cyc. L. & Pr. 60.
The emphasis laid by our law upon the partners as individuals is well illustrated along these same lines in Walsh
v. Kirby, 228 Pa. 194, 1916, wherein suit was brought against
"F. M. Kirby and F. J. Weckesser, trading as F. M. Kirby
& Company." The summons was served on Kirby alone.
Elkin, J. said:
"We think it is clear on both reason and authority
that service upon one or more members of a partnership in a suit instituted against the firm is a good service
for the purpose of affecting the partnership with notice
and in the event of recovery of binding the partnership
property. Of course the personal and separate estate of
a partner not served will not be bound by the judgment
recovered against the partnership. If it is sought to
hold not only the partnership property but the separate
and personal estate of each individual partner then the
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service must be made upon each partner. In other words,
the individual and separate estate of a partner is not
bound by a judgment against the partnership unless
personal service of the writ is made upon the partner
whose property is sought to be bound."
Following these cases it is probably true in Pennsylvania that if suit is brought against and in the name of a
partnership and the summons under the Service Act of July
9, 1901, P. L. 614, is served upon some agent or manager
of the partnership at the partner's place of business but
service was not had upon any partner, a judgment obtained
in the name of and against the partnership would not support an execution other than against the partnership property. Furthermore, it appears to some that these cases
indicate a recognition of the entity of the firm by reason
of the liability of the firm property for firm obligations.
The Uniform Act of March 26, 1915, P. L. 18, was
drawn by Dr. William Draper Lewis, late Dean, and afterwards Professor in the Law Department of the University
of Pennsylvania and now at the head of the American Law
Institute. Quoting from the article in Dickinson Law Review for March, 1916, already referred to, it is said:
"'Much space has been devoted in the magazine
articles cited concerning the theory of partnership
which has been adopted by the language of the Act.
The learned draftsman and the Committee apparently
are of the opinion that the common law theory has
been adopted. To this assumption Mr. Judson A.
Crane in his article in the June number, 1915, of
Harvard Law Review takes serious exception and
argues that the legal person theory or so called mercantile view should have been adopted and in fact has
been unconsciously recognized in the very terms of
the act.
It appears to the writer that the true version of
the matter is that neither the aggregate or common
law theory nor the legal person theory has actually been
adopted but that without really giving credit the terms
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of the act are only explicable by a reference to the
status theory already referred to as advanced by Professor Parsons."
The comment of Professor Warren on this same point
in his recent work at pages 300 and 301, is thus stated:
"The truth of the matter seems to us to be that
the Uniform Partnership Law is based, partly upon
the aggregate theory, and partly upon an entity theory,
-Dr. Lewis' entity theory. The language of the Act
reminds us of the language of some political platforms.
There is some language which will please those who
approve the aggregate theory. There is other language
which will please those who approve the entity
theory .....
The language is not clear because the
thought is not clear. We all dislike to be technical
or fussy over grammatical inaccuracies; we want to
be broadminded, and to regard substance and not form.
But if anyone says that the distinction is a mere technicality, a distinction of form and not of substance, a
mere difference in the form of expression, he is mistaken."
To which may be added this thought, that the interpretation of the Act reminds one of the difficulties of those
interpreting the synoptic gospels upon the theory that different parts were written at different times by different
authors with different views and finally compiled by a third
person without regard to the divergences.
The Century Dictionary thus defines generally the
word partnership:
"The state or condition of being a partner; joint
interest; participation with another."
Following this thought the English Partnership Act
of 1890 declares that:
"Partnership is the relation which subsists between
persons carrying on a business in common with a view
of profit."

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The American Uniform Partnership Act departs from
this English precedent and ostensibly seeks to improve the
definition as follows:
"Section 6. (1) A partnership is an association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
Despite the opinion of the learned author that this definition accords with the common law theory of partnership,
it is submitted that the definition leads away from the
aggregate theory and stresses the organization too much
as such rather than as purely a relation of the partners
which is the result of a contract entered into by them, and
that many parts of the Act are wholly unintelligible from
the common law theory standpoint unless we are furnished
with some code of interpretation as to the meaning of the
word "Partnership" as it appears throughout the Act, and
this code is not furnished within the confines of the Act
except as we may glean it from the definition as given.
If the draftsman had followed the English definition,
the thought would be more clear but we can only attain
that same clarity in the present definition by some transposition as the following:
"Partnership is the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
Thus no emphasis is laid on the partnership but rather
on the individuals in a relation or association in partnership.
To the definition should be added an explanation that
wherever in the Act the word partnership appears it is to
be construed as meaning either (a) the joint partners or
(b) the aggregate of the property real and personal contributed or acquired by the joint partners and dedicated
to partnership uses and known as the partnership Estate.
Following this suggested code for the interpretation
of the Act, let us test it by reference to certain sections.
The following section has been much criticised by Mr.
Crane:
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(1) All
"Section 8. (Partnership Property.)
property originally brought into the partnership stock
or subsequently acquired, by purchase or otherwise, on
account of the partnership is partnership property.
(2) Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership funds is partnership
property.
(3) Any estate in real property may be acquired
in the partnership name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.
(4) A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though without words of inheritance, passes
the entire estate of the grantor unless a contrary intent appears."
Prior to the passage of the Uniform Act in Pennsylvania and following the theory of our cases already quoted,
the courts declared repeatedly that the title to partnership
personal property was in the firm and would pass by a
transfer in the name of the firm. On the contrary, however, in the case of real estate it was distinctly held, following common law theory, that the legal title to real
estate could not be taken in the impersonal name of a
firm, i. e., Carlisle Land Company or Pittsburgh Oil Company. The reason assigned is that the law only permits
the vesting of a real estate title in a legal person, i. e., a
human being or a corporation, and as a partnership is not
a legal person, such a deed of conveyance would constitute
a legal futility because it lacked as an essential element a
legally recognizable grantee to accept the title.
In Trexler v. Africa, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 542, 1910, Morrison, J. said:
"It does not appear in the record that the American
Stave & Lumber Company was a corporation. It must,
therefore, have been a partnership name or a fictitious
name, and under the above quoted authority, the conveyance by Fritch and wife by the deed of August 4, 1894, to
the American Stave & Lumber Company did not vest the
legal title to the land therein described in that company,
because it had no such legal existence as would entitle it
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to be a grantee in a deed of real estate." See also 30
Cyc. 431.
Under the present section a title to real estate "may
be acquired in the partnership name" and it is further
stated that such "conveyance to a partnershipin the partnership name, though without words of inheritance, passes the
entire estate of the grantor unless a contrary intent appears." In whom then is the title vested? A name cannot
of itself be the recipient of a title, and if the name represents an inanimate object, i. e., the town clock or a cemetery
lot, it is equally futile as an act of conveyancing. Can It
be said that the title is vested in the partnership as an
entity when under the hypothesis there is no entity?
It is stated in Section 4 (4) that the Act "shall be so
interpreted and construed as to effect its general purpose
to make uniform the law of those states which enact it."
Furthermore, it is a cardinal rule of construction that the
general intent of a document must be obtained by a reading of the same in its entirety. By reference to Sections
24 and 25 it appears, therefore, reasonably apparent that
when the draftsman speaks of a " conveyance to a partnership" he means a conveyance to the partners and not to an
entity or legal person created by the act and known as a
partnership. It is unfortunate as already suggested that
the draftsman did not adhere strictly to phraseology which
would emphasize the partners as individuals rather than
the partnership as an organization. We join with Professor
Warren in the expression as found at page 301 of his work:
"Drafting the Uniform Partnership Act afforded a wonder.ul opportunity to give a clear and unambiguous answer to
that question. We think that no such answer is given by
the Act, and that this is a matter for profound regret."
The writer in the quotation just made is referring to
the distinction between the rights and obligations of the
partners as human beings and the rights and obligations
of some possible legal unit that may have been created.
Referring further to the Act, Section 9 states that
every partner is "an agent of the partnership" and that his
act within the limits of authority "binds the partnership."
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What is evidently meant is that each partner within certain
limits is an agent of his co-partners and when he acts
within these limits such act is binding upon all of the copartners as an act done in the relation of partnership.
In Section 10 in treating of an unauthorized conveyance of real property held in partnership it is stated that
"the partnership may recover such property" under certain
conditions and further on in the section in paragraph 3
there is a reference to "the right of the partnership". Section 11 refers to "evidence against the partnership", and
Section 12 refers to "knowledge of the partnership".
Section 13 in referring to a wrongful act or omission
of any partner, states that under certain conditions "the
partnership is liable" and Section 14 pursuing the same line
of thought refers to the fact that the "partnership is bound"
under certain conditions. Section 15 in treating of a partner's liabilities states (a) that under certain conditions
partners are liable jointly and severally for everything
"chargeable to the partnership" and (b) that as partners,
are jointly liable for "all other debts and obligations of the
partnership."
To quote again from Professor Warren's work at
page 296:
"When we move about in Sections 13, 14 and 15 we
feel that we must be in the wrong house. And as we
go through other sections of the Act, the feeling that
there must be some mistake increases."
Agreeing that these quotations from the Act and
others of a similar nature found therein are unfortunate
expressions in an act which is stated to be based upon the
common law or aggregate theory of partnership, yet such
incongruities fade away when the expressions are interpreted in the light of the code which has been suggested.
That this is the view taken by a certain part at least of
the Profession in Pennsylvania and also of certain County
Courts and the Superior Court wherein partnership questions have been recently litigated appears in the following
citations:
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Blaustein v. Shapiro, et al, 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 235,
1919; Cairns v. Spencer, et al, 87 Pa. Super. Ct. 126, 1925;
Bostwick's Estate, 8 D. & C., 455, 1926; Levine v. Hesse
& Co., 11 D. & C., 570, 1928.
Property Rights of a Partner
This subject is presented in Sections 24, 25 and 26 of
the Act. These Sections constitute the very heart of partnership and are clearer in expression and phraseology than
any others. But, nevertheless, they likewise present certain
problems which will now be discussed.
These sections appear to be strangely set in the midst
of the Act. The reader of course, has been warned in the
definition that the persons who have formed the partnership are "the co-owners of the business". Nevertheless
there follows so much about the partnership, its rights and
obligations, that the sections interlarded come somewhat
as a surprise. Moreover, following these sections, the
"partnership" thought is immediately continued. Howbeit,
the draftsman declares:
"Section 24-(Extent of Property Rights of a
Partner.)-The Property rights of a partner are (1)
his rights in specific partnership property, (2) his interest in the partnership and (3) his rights to participate in the management".
By Section 25 a partner is designated as a co-owner
with his partners of specific partnership property according
to the tabulated incidents of a tenancy created by the
statute as a tenancy in partnership.
The complement of these sections is found in the following:
"Section 26-(Nature of Partner's Interest in the
Partnership)-A partner's interest in the partnership
is his share of the profits and surplus, and the same is
personal property".
The comment made on these sections and Section 9,
before referred to, is quoted from the March Number, 1916,
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of this Review:
"The legal and practical result of the aforegoing
sections may be shown, in large part, by the following
illustrations.
A, B & C associate themselves as partners to carry
on in Carlisle and vicinity the business of buying land
and selling the same in bulk or by subdivision. The
firm does business under the name and style of Carlisle
Land Company. Each member of the firm contributes
the sum of $10,000 to capital. Of the total capital
$30,000, the sum of $20,000 is used in acquiring a tract
of land to be subdivided into building lots. The $10,000,
remaining is devoted as working capital for the development of the tract. The legal title to the land
is taken in the name of Carlisle Land Company.
A, B & C are recognized under the sections quoted
as the legal owners of the land, holding the title to
the same, however, as tenants in partnership, using the
name of Carlisle Land Company as a convenient designation of what Dean Lewis calls the grouping of activities but which appears to be simply another way of
arriving at Professor Parson's theory already alluded
to. There is no recognition by the law of the Carlisle
Land Company as an entity or legal person but there is,
by virtue of the association of A, B & C as partners,
a distinct stamp placed upon the partnership property
or, to put it directly, there is a peculiar status or condition placed upon the partners in their relation to the
partnership property and their rights therein. The
partner can only deal with the partnership property
for partnership purposes. Furthermore, a partner's
separate creditor cannot affect the specific partnership
property and on the death of a partner his right in the
specific partnership property becomes extinct, the legal
title vesting solely in the survivor. Thus there is no
subject matter upon which any dower, curtesy or other
right of widows, husbands, heirs or next of kin can
attach in the case of real estate. A fee simple title is
vested by the terms of the statute without the use of
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words of inheritance and if it is desired that a lot of
ground be conveyed this may be done by any one of
the partners executing and acknowledging in the name
of the partnership a deed of conveyance."
As already stated, the key to the interpretation of those
portions of the Act treating of "the partnership" is that
such references are to the partnership as property dedicated
to the joint purposes and not to the individual partners merged
into an entity or unity. This interpretation is in accord with
Professor Parson's theory above outlined and also follows
the contract of the partners. To continue the illustration
just given, the contributions of the partners yield a total
capital of $30,000, which is invested as stated. These investments represent the assets of the partnership and these
assets, under the terms of the contract of the co-partners
by an implication of law, are dedicated to the specified joint
purposes and uses. This stipulation, interpolated by law
into the contract, gives rise to what is known asthe equity
of the partners, which means that each partner has a right
against his copartners to insist that all liabilities incurred
by them as partners in the joint venture shall be paid first
out of the assets held in partnership. Through this right
of the partners, firm creditors derive a preferential claim
on firm assets to the exclusion of other obligations incurred
by the partners individually or jointly but not for partnership purposes. Snodgrass' Appeal, 13 Pa. 474, (1850). See
also Overholt's Appeal, 12 Pa. 222 (1849) and Hershey v.
Fulmer, 3 Pa. C. C. 442 (1887). Generally, for partner's
equity, 25 Dickinson Law Review 99, (1921). In the article
just cited, the deduction is drawn that the Uniform Act
does not by its terms preclude the partners from waiving
their equities against one another and that such acts of
waiver do not constitute a fraud upon the rights of firm
creditors. However, by the Act of May 21st, 1921, P. L.
1045, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act which reads, in part, as
follows:
"Section 8. Conveyance of Partnership Property :-Every conveyance of partnership property and
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every partnership obligation incurred, when the partnership is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, is
fraudulent as to partnership creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation is incurred:
(a)
To a partner, whether with or without a
promise by him to pay partnership debts; or
(b) To a person not a partner without fair consideration tO the partnership as distinguished from consideration to the individual partners".
By the terms of Section 1 of the same Act a conveyance
is stated to include "every payment of money, assignment,
release, transfer, lease, mortgage, or pledge of tangible or
intangible property, and also the creation of any lien or
incumbrance."
By the inclusion of "release" within the meaning of
the word "conveyance", it would appear that a release by
the partners of their respective rights to insist upon the
application of the firm assets to the liquidation of the firm
liabilities would be "fraudulent as to partnership creditors"
within the scope of the Act.
Conversely, however, in Gallagher's Appeal, 114 Pa.
353, (1886) it was held to be no fraud for a partner to pay
firm debts out of his separate Estate, even though his separate creditors remain unpaid, and he is rendered thereby
unable to pay them.
It may be noted that Section 2 (2) of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act provides that in determining
whether a partnership is insolvent there shall be added
to the partnership property the present, fair, salable, value
of the separate assets of each general partner in excess of
the amount probably sufficient to meet the claims of his
separate creditors.
Suppose, however, individual creditors of the partners
obtain judgments against them separately, issue executions
and levy upon the respective partners' interests in the
partnership as these interests are defined in Section 26 of
the Uniform Partnership Act and the facts are similar to
Doner v. Stauffer, 1 P. & W. 203 (1829) and its long train of
authority, will the result be the same or does the Uniform
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Partnership Act make a change in law as heretofore?
The law, following the dictum of Doner v. Stauffer is
thus expressed by Brown, P. J. in Richard v. Allen, 117 Pa.
201, (1887):
"However illogical it may appear that a purchaser
of two or more intangible interests in property should
thereby become the owner of the corpus of the property, such is the well settled law of Pennsylvania as
applied to the purchase by the same person, of the interests of all the partners in the partnership property."
As has been pointed out in 25 Dickinson Law Review
103, the same reasoning is applied when at the same sale,
both interests are sold to different purchasers. Kelly's Appeal, 16 Pa. 59, (1851); Vandike's Appeal, 17 Pa. 271 (1851);
Vandike's Appeal, 57 Pa. 9, (1868).
In the article in 25 Dickinson Law Review at p. 108,
it is intimated that the Act has not changed the law. This
was written prior to the passage of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Does this Act in the quotation already made throw; any light upon this question? It is
submitted that it does not. The provisions cited have no
bearing upon the acts of creditors. They refer to the acts
of the partners exclusively. Furthermore, a judgment obtained by a separate creditor against a partner would not
come within these provisions because such judgment would
not be a "lien or incumbrance" upon the partnership assets.
So far in Pennsylvania there are no recorded cases
throwing light upon the provisions of Section 8 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
Application of Property at Law
For the contractual obligations incurred in partnership, the co-owners of the business are jointly responsible.
This liability is enforced by an action against the partners
jointly. If the summons is served upon both defendants, the judgment later entered becomes a-lien on all real
estate held by the partners as such or as individuals, jointly
or separately. Furthermore, such a judgment is a lien on
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separate real estate and is entitled to priority over.the judgment of a separate creditor of a partner as regards the
latter's real estate, if the judgment was entered prior to
that of the separate creditor. Cumming's Appeal, 25 Pa.
268, (1855). Conversely, if the separate creditor's judgment is prior in time to the judgment of a firm creditor
against all the partners, nevertheless the judgment of the
firm creditor is the only lien considered as against the
partnership real estate. Kramer v. Arthur, 7 Pa. 165.
If an execution is issued by a firm creditor against the
partners, i. e., A and B, the creditor has three possible
sources of satisfaction, i. e., (1) the partnership property,
(2), the separate estate of A, (3) the separate estate of B.
As stated by Professor Warren, supra, page 25:
"The judgment creditor can satisfy his judgment
out of any property of the partners or any one of
them. The judgment is against all, but the execution
may be against any one,-the judgment is joint, but
the execution may be several. And there is no requirement that the partnership cre'ditor must exhaust
partnership assets before he takes separate assets."
Citing, Stevens v. Perry, 113 Mass. 380; Camp v. Grant, 21
Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec.. 321; Meech v. Allen, 17 N. Y. 300, 72
Am. Dec. 465; contra Jarvis v. Brooks, 23 N. H. 136; see also,
Liberty National Bank v. Bear, 265 U. S. 365, 44 Sup. Ct. 499,
68 L. Ed. 1057.
Application of Property In Equity
When the assets of the partners pass into the custody
through a bill in equity, insolvency or bankruptcy
law
of
proceedings, the rule, long observed in equity practice, of
keeping distinct the partnership assets and the assets of
respective, individual partners prevails universally in this
country. The method of marshalling assets and liabilities
in such cases is illustrated by Section 5-f of the National
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provides as follows:
"The net proceeds of the partnership property shall
be appropriated to the payment of the partnership
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debts, and the net proceeds of the individual estate of
each partner to the payment of his individual debts.
Should any surplus remain of the property of any partner after paying his individual debts, such surplus shall
be added to the partnership assets and be applied to
the payment of the partnership debts. Should any
surplus of the partnership property remain after paying the partnership debts, such surplus shall be added
to the assets of the individual partners in the proportion of their respective interests in the partnership."
This rule of marshalling assets became the law in
Pennsylvania after some vicissitude. Said Lowell, J. lit Re
Wilcox, 94 Fed. 101:
"After prolonged hesitation, Bell v. Newman was
explicitly overruled, and the general rule of distribution was definitely established in Pennsylvania. Black's
Appeal, 44 Pa. 252; McCormick's Appeal, 55 Pa. 252.
The history of the mutation is interesting. In Bell v.
Newman, 5 S. & R. 78, 1819, the question was presented of
a dissolved partnership and the right of partnership creditors to come in pro rata with separate creditors in the distribution of the deceased partner's separate estate. The
partnership creditors had already participated exclusively in
the distribution of an insufficient partnership estate. The
Act of April 19th, 1794, applying to a decedent's estate, provided that all creditors of an equal nature should receive
an equal share of the intestate's estate. Tilghman, C. J.
labors between the English rule requiring that joint, i. e.,
partnership property be applied to joint, i. e., partnership
debts and separate property to separate debts with the requirement of equality of the Act of 1794. The Chief Justice
reaches the conclusion that to do equity and at the same
time observe the mandate of the Statute respecting all
creditors-the partnership creditors being as much creditors of the deceased partner as were his separate creditorsthe separate creditors should receive out of the separate
estate an equal amount as the partnership creditors received
out of the partnership estate, after which the two classes
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of creditors should pairticipate pari passu in the distribu.tion of the separate estate. To quote from the opinion
of the Chief Justice:
"As the facts are stated in this case, it must be
taken for granted, that the joint property in the hands
of the defendant belonged equally to the estates of
Cookson and Waddington; consequently, when all the
joint property has been applied to the payment of the
joint debts, the partnership creditors will have, in fact,
received the amount of one-half from the estate of
Waddington. I suppose, for example, that they have
received twenty cents in the dollar; then ten cents in
the dollar have been paid from the estate of Waddington, and to administer equity to his separate creditors,
it will be proper that the plaintiffs (th6 only separate
creditors known to the Court) should first receive ten
cents in the dollar from the separate estate, after which
each of the joint creditors and the plaintiffs are to divide the balance of the separate estate among them
equally, pro rata, according to the balance of their
debts respectively. This puts all the creditors of Waddington on an equal footing, so far as concerns his
estate, and is in exact conformity to our act of assembly; the whole estate of Waddington, that is to
say, his whole separate property, and his whole interest in the joint property being 'divided among all his
creditors of equal degree, equally, pro rata. As to the
portion which the joint creditors receive from that part
of the joint property belonging to Cookson's estate,
the separate creditors have no reason to complain of
it, because they trusted Waddington only; but the joint
creditors trusted both Waddington and Cookson. It
will be remembered, that I have assumed it as a fact
in this case, that the joint property in the hands of the
defendants belonged equally to the estate of each partner. No rule, therefore, is intended to be laid down,
which may affect cases differently circumstanced.
Where the equity between the partners is different, it
may perhaps occasion a difference of equity between
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the creditors."
With this conclusion Duncan, J. concurred, but Justice Gibson defended the general rule that partnership
creditors were confined to the partnership estate and separate creditors to the separate estate, urging:
"But it appears to me, the rule is founded in the
most substantial justice. Why should any class of
creditors, in preference to the rest, be exclusively entitled to the joint fund, and concurrently entitled to the
separate estate? Equality is equity; and the joint
creditors, in being exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, have already an immense advantage over
the separate creditors; it is the largest; for men in
trade usually embark their all in it; and seldom have
much separate property. And independently of distributive rights, the joint creditors have a degree of security for their debts, and facilities in recovering them,
which the separate creditors have not; they can sell
both joint and separate estate on an execution; while
the separate creditors can sell only the separate estate,
and the interest in the concern that may remain to the
partner, after the accounts of the debts and effects of
the partnership are taken, as between the partners and
their creditors, and as between the partners themselves. This exclusive liability of the partnership estate to the joint creditors is founded on no equity peculiar to themselves, but results from the nature of the
contract of partnership, which requires the joint debts
to be paid before the equity can be settled between the
partners, each being individually liable till all is paid;
concede the present question to the joint creditors, and
you give them in effect a monopoly of the insolvent's
whole estate. What merit do they possess that the
separate creditors may not lay claim to? In the usual
course of transactions, each class indiscriminately
trusts to the whole estate, both joint and separate."
In Houseal & Smith's Appeal, 45 Pa. 484, 1863, an effort
was made by separate creditors of a partner to be admit-
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ted pari passu with the firm creditors against the firm
assets. In the interval, however, between this case and
Bell v. Newman, the Supreme Court had repudiated the majority opinion in the latter case. Andress v. Miller, 15 Pa. 316,
1450; Walker v. Eyth, 25 Pa. 216, 1855; Black's Appeal, 44
Pa. 503, 1863. Consequently, in Houseal & Smith's Appeal,
the rule adopted was accorded further adherence, the case
being this: A and B were partners and became insolvent.
The firm owed A, consequently the separate creditors of A
asked to be let in upon the partnership assets, but the partner was the debtor of the partnership creditors, hence his
claim could not compete with the firm creditors, and his
separate creditors would have no higher rights. For the
converse of this situation there is McCormick's Appeal, 55
Pa. 252, 1866, wherein the firm as creditor of a debtor partner was denied participation in the estate of a deceased partner, the respective estates, of course, being insolvent. The
case was this: H and M were partners and, H dying, it was
found that the partners individually and the firm were insolvent. At the time of H's death he owed the firm
$17,600.00 and M owed the firm $11,205.00. M as surviving
partner made an assignment of the firm property for the
benefit of its creditors. The account of H's administrator
showed a balance of $3207.60, and an auditor was appointed
to distribute this balance among H's creditors. The assignees claimed to come in on the fund for a dividend on the
whole amount of H's indebtedness to the firm. The claim
was excluded by the auditor and his report was confirmed
by the Orphan's Court. Upon appeal the Supreme Court
per Agnew, J., held that the indebtedness of the partners
to the firm should be set off and in the adjustment onehalf of the difference taken, which would be the amount
the assignees could prove against the partners estate. The
difference between the two debts was $5585.45 and the onehalf of this was $2792.72 upon which latter amount a dividend of $701.81 was allowed. The Court said:"It is a question of the marshalling of assets in
which the equities of each class of creditors must be
preserved. The firm creditors have no standing in the
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distribution of the fund belonging to the separate estate, until the separate creditors are satisfied. It is
only the surviving partner representing the firm who
can claim as the separate creditor of his partner for
the balance found due on the adjustment of the partnership affairs. It is therefore through him that the
partnership creditors receive anything from the separate estate, and it is only when paid to him as a separate creditor by survivorship their interest attaches.
They can claim nothing in their own right. The case
of Houseal & Smith's Appeal, 9 Wright 484, is not in
point. That was a case where the individual creditors
of one of the partners asked to be let in upon the partnership assets on the ground that he was a creditor of
the firm. But the difficulty which met them was, that
the partner, under whose wing they attempted to
shelter themselves, was himself the debtor of the partnership creditors, and they met him with a superior
equity, which postponed his claim until they were satisfied, and, as a consequence, postponed his individual
creditors who asked to be subrogated to his rights."
Accord, Singizer's Appeal, 28 Pa. 524, 1857.
See also Leidy v. Messinger, 71 Pa. 177. In Bankruptcy
see In re Telfer, 184 Fed. 224; In re Wells, 298 Fed. 109.
However, the rule under discussion only applies to
partnership estates and does not include mere joint estates,
Snodgrass' Appeal, 13 Pa. 471, 1850, and likewise it is only
applicable in the case of partnership liabilities as distinguished from simple joint debts. Appeal of Collins, 1 Pennypacker 339, 1882.
The advocates of the entity theory of partnership maintain that the rule of marshalling assets is a recognition of
the firm as a distinct person. However, Judge Lowell, in
his scholarly opinion, In Re Wilcox, 94 Fed. 104, observes:
. "The historical origin of the rule lies not improbably in an ancient practice of distributing the joint
estate under a joint commission and the separate estate under a separate commission, each commission
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dealing with its corresponding creditors. The best
theoretic defence of the rule is probably this: The
operation of the law of partnership which gives to any
separate partner or his assignee only his net share of
the partnership assets-a rule manifestly founded in
justice and convenience-usually insures to the joint
creditors a priority in the application of the joint estate, and therefore this half of the rule has seldom been
questioned. The priority given to the separate creditor in the application of the separate estate is a rough,
but practical, offset to the inequality caused by the rule
governing the application of the joint Estate." See
the dissenting opinion of Judge Gibson in Bell v. Newman, 5 S. & R. 78. Entirely apart from statute, however, two things are quite clear: First, that the general rule, with some variations, is established in the
Courts of this Country and of England; and, Second,
that these variations, and particularily the exception
in the absence of joint estate, have tended to discredit
the rule, and to confuse its operations, rather than to
obviate its difficulties."
In Murrill v. Neill, 8 Howard 414, the Supreme Court
of the United States said:
"The rule in equity governing the administration
of insolvent partnerships is one of familiar acceptance
and practice; it is one which will be found to have been
in practice in this country from the beginning of our
judicial history, and to have been generally if not universally received. This rule, with one or two eccentric
variations in the English practice which may be noted
hereafter, is believed to be identical with that prevailing in England, and is this: That partnership creditors shall, in the first instance, be satisfied from the
partnership estate; and separate or private creditors
of the individual partners from the separate and private estate of the partners with whom they have made
private and individual contracts: and that the private
and individual property of the partners shall not be
applied in extinguishment of partnership debts until
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the separate and individual creditors of the respective
partners shall be paid. The reason and foundation of
this rule, or its equality and fairness, the Court is not
called upon to justify. Were these less obvious than
they are, it were enough to show the early adoption
and general prevalence of this rule to stay the hand of
innovation at this day, at least under any motive less
strong than the most urgent propriety."
Nevertheless, it has been held under the present Bankruptcy Act that a partnership as distinct from the partners may be adjudged a bankrupt. Liberty National Bank v.
Bear, 265 U. S. 365; Meek v. Center Co. Banking Co., 268 U.
S. 426; Myers v. International Trust Co., 273 U. S.380.
Exceptions
The following cases illustrate exceptions to the rule as
they have been recognized in England and in parts of this
country.
In Farmers & Mechanics National Bank -6. Ridge Avenue
Bank, 240 U. S. 498, 1916, the question of law presented to
the Supreme Court upon certificate of the court below was
as follows:
"When a partnership as such is insolvent, and when
each individual member is also insolvent, and when the
only fund for distribution is produced by the individual
estate of one member, are the individual creditors of
such member entitled to priority in the distribution of
the fund ?"
The Court in answering this question in the affirmative
repudiated the English exception to the rule in favor of
the right of partnership creditors to prove pari passu with
the individual creditors against the individual estate and
denied that this exception had attained such recognition
in the American Cases as to warrant its interpolation into
Section 5-f of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, declaring further
that the origin and source of the English exception had no
justification or place in our present Bankruptcy Act.
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In Estate of Sperry, 1 Ashmead 347, an undated decision
of President Judge King of the First Pennsylvania Judicial
District, the reports being published in 1831 and the case
decided sometime between 1825 and 1831, it was held that
where there was no partnership estate and no living solvent partner, the partnership creditors would be permitted
to prove their claims pari passu with the separate creditors
against the separate estate of a partner.
This decision came under the influence of Bell v. Newman, 5 S. & R. 78, 1819, but has never been followed and apparently has never been commented upon judicially. On
the contrary in Estate of Bennett, 13 Phila. 331, 1880, Penrose, J. declared:
"It is true that in England, where there is no joint
estate and no solvent partner, the joint creditors are
entitled to rank as separate creditors against the sepaWhether
rate estate of the individual partner ....
in Pennsylvania the rule which gives separate creditors priority over joint creditors with respect to separate assets is subject to the qualification established in
England, and above referred to, is, in view of what was
said by C. J. Thompson, in Black's App., 8 Wright 507-8,
very doubtful."
The same observations will be found in Estate of
D'Invilliers, 13 Phila. 362, 1880 and Stauffer's Estate, 3 D. R.
794, 1894. See also Pepper & Lewis' Digest of Decisions,
Volume 15, Col. 26034. This exception is apparently not
accepted as law in Pennsylvania and, if this is correct, is in
accord with Bankruptcy Law and the view of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
In Jamison's Estate, 163 Pa. 143, 1894, a creditor held
a judgment against a partnership and also a separate judgment against the individual partners for the same debt.
It was held that he was entitled to prove the full debt
against not only the partner fund but the funds of the
respective separate estates of the partners. Said Mitchell, J.
"The partners are liable individually, but it is by
reason of their membership of the firm, and their in-
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dividual property is liable only secondarily. It is the
settled rule that where there are partnership and separate assets, and the firm is insolvent, each class has
priority upon its respective estate: Black's Appeal, 44
Pa. 503. The appellant was in both classes, he had a
judgment in each which gave him a primary claim on
that particular fund."
In Fourth National Bank v. Mead, 216 Mass. 521, 1914,
the same ruling was made on similar facts. Referring to
Section 81 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the Court
said:
"The result is that a partner who individually endorses before delivery Commercial paper made by his
firm is a "person, not otherwise a party" in the sense
in which those words are employed, in Section 81. It
follows that the claims of each of the plaintiff's should
be allowed against the estate of the deceased partner."
In Robinson v. Seaboard National Bank, 247 Fed. 667,
1918, Buffington, Circuit judge for the Third Circuit, applied the same ruling in administering the bankruptcy
law saying:
"This is not a case of double proof on a single
contract, but of single proof of two separate contracts."
In Jamison's Estate, supra, Mitchell, J. said further:
"The main question is whether appellant, having a
judgment against the partnership, and also a separate
judgment against the individual partners for the same
debt, is entitled to a dividend on each out of its respective estate.
It is settled that a creditor of an assigned estate
is entitled to a dividend on the full amount of his debt
at the date of the assignment, notwithstanding he has
collateral security of any kind on which he has, or may
hereafter receive a partial payment of his debt: Morris
v. Otwine, 22 Pa. 441; Patten's Appeal, 45 Pa. 151; Borough's Est., 71 Pa. 460; Graeff's Appeal, 79 Pa. 148;
Miller's Est., 82 Pa. 113."
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In Appeal of York County Bank, 32 Pa. 446, 1859, the
facts were that A and B had entered into partnership and
by their articles agreed that A should have the exclusive
ownership of the capital stock until B should contribute
certain sums of money to said stock. An execution creditor
of A levied on the firm property and this was followed by
another execution by a firm creditor. The question was
which execution was superior in point of law. Said Thompson, J:
"When a creditor levies on the property of a firm,
his execution fixes and attaches to this right to the
same extent that it existed in the partners, and hence
the preference over a separate execution-creditor in
the distribution. All this is predicable of a case of
joint property only. But where there was no joint
property, the rule has nothing to operate on. The mere
name is not enough in such case-there must be an
equity. If that equity never existed, a creditor's execution could not attach to any right, amounting to a
lien, to have the assets appropriated to a partnership
debt. That Moore has no interest in the firm property
is found by the auditor. That this was a necessary
conclusion from the article of copartnership, and a
failure to comply with it, cannot be doubted. In fact,
that the very appearance of claim was renounced by
Moore, before the execution was issued by the appellant, was also an ascertained fact by the auditor. This
being so, the property levied on was individual property in fact, although seized in the firm's name. The
appellant cannot work out his equity through the partners, for they, as such, did not exist, inter se, and the
individual owner could not give him this right over a
prior execution against him individually. The property
was all individual property, and priority of seizure gave
priority of right in the distribution. To the complaint
that the property was in appearance firm property, that
it is a fraud on a creditor of the firm not to hold it so
in facL, notwithstanding it may not have been so, it
may be answered, that a creditor can seize no more
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than belongs to the debtor, and succeeds only to his
rights as defined by law, and that he can blame no
one but himself for becoming a creditor."
In Bogue's Appeal, 83 Pa. 101, 1876, the principle of
York County Bank's Appeal was recognized but the facts
there were distinguished. The contest was between a separate and a partnership creditor, both of whom had issued
executions. The separate creditor contended that there
was no partnership, hence no partnership property, but the
return of the sheriff on the separate execution stated distinctly that the levy was made on the debtor's interest in
the partnership. The Court held that the auditor in distributing the fund raised on the execution sales could not
inquire into the matter further than the record disclosed
and the separate creditor was concluded by the return
which stated distinctly that his levy was on an interest
in the partnership and thus, as the Court observed, recognized the partnership as such.
In Appeal of Scull, 145 Pa. 141, 1886, A advertised in
newspapers that he intended carrying on business as A &
Company, "admitting B and C to interests." No partnership
ever actually existed although B and C were employed in
the business. The contest was between individual creditors
of A who first issued executions and other creditors of
A and Company who subsequently issued executions,
both levying upon the assets of the business. The individual creditors prevailed, the Court deciding that the case
fell within the rulings of Doner v. Stauffer, 1 P & W 198,
Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. 76 and York County Bank's Appeal, 32
Pa. 446. Another illustration is found in Bixler v. Kresge,
169 Pa. 405, 1895, wherein a boy under age permitted himself to be held out as the partner of an adult. Actually the
boy was merely an employee and had contributed nothing
of property value to the business. He signed notes along
with the adult in affairs connected with the business but on
coming of age he disaffirmed these obligations. It was
decided that the case fell within the doctrine of York
County Bank's Appeal. To the same effect is Himmielreich v.
Shaffer, 182 Pa. 201, 1897.
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The following two cases will illustrate further exceptions to the general rule:
In McGrudden v. Jonas, 173 Pa. 507, 1896, there were
two partnerships doing business, one under the name of
Parisian Cloak & Suit Company of Pittsburgh, and the
other I. Jonas & Company of Chicago. The former was
composed of four persons and the latter of three persons.
All members of I. Jonas & Company were members of the
Parisian Cloak & Suit Company but the Parisian Cloak &
Suit Company had one more partner, making four in that
firm. The Parisian Cloak & Suit Company executed three
notes payable to the order of I. Jonas & Company who endorsed the same to Yetta Greenboum as collateral security
for a pre-existing indebtedness of the payees to her. Both
firms become insolvent and the question arose in the matter
of the distribution to creditors. Held: Where an insolvent
partnership composed of four persons gives a promissory
note to another insolvent partnership composed of three
persons, all of whom are members of the drawer partnership, and the note is transferred by the payee as collateral
security for a pre-existing debt to a third person who has
full knowledge of the affairs of both partnerships, such
holder of the note will be postponed to the other creditors
of the firm which made the note. An insolvent partnership
composed of three of the four members of a second insolvent partnership cannot, as a creditor of the latter, share
equally with the latter's other creditors in the distribution
of its assets.
There is nothing in the Act of April 14, 1838, P. L. 457,
which will sustain such a claim. Said McCollum, J:
"The learned Court below in awarding to Mrs.
Greenboum the balance of the fund remaining after
paying thereout the claims of the other creditors in
full gaveoher all that she was entitled to, and all that
the parties to whose rights she succeeded could possibly have received from it. As they were liable for
all the claims of the other creditors they could not
have participated in the distribution until those claims
were satisfied. This is a proposition in accordance
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with equity and well sustained by the decisions of this
court: Erb's Appeal, 2 P. & W. 296; Himes v. Barnitz,
8 Watts, 39; Worral's Appeal, 41 Pa. 524, and Datesman's
Appeal, 77 Pa. 243. There is nothing in the Act of
April 14, 1838, which sustains the contention that an
insolvent partnership composed of three of the four
members of another insolvent partnership can as a
creditor of the latter share equally with its other
creditors in the distribution of its assets. This act
has been severely and justly criticised in most if not all
of the cases in which it has been considered but it has
never yet produced such results as are contended for
in this case: Tassey v. Church, 6 W. & S. 465; Pennock
v. Shayne, 6 W. & S. 239, and Allen v. Erie City Bank,
57 Pa. 129."
Commenting on the Act of 1838, Warren, Corporate
Advantages Without Incorporation, at page 119 says:
"In Pennsylvania, it was provided by the Act of
14th of April, 1838, that (to speak in terms of the
letters we have used above) A., B. and C. might maintain an action at law against A., D. and E. When the
Court came to consider this, it said that apparently the
legislature was soon aware that this Act, if the judgment were carried out by execution, might work the
most palpable injustice, and that to prevent such injustice the legislature gave the Courts, by the Act of
13th of October, 1840, all the power of a Court of
Chancery in settling partnership accounts." See also
Huff man Farm Company v. Rusk, 173 Pa. 264."
On the other hand in Haines & Company's Estate, 176
Pa. 354, a firm consisted of seven members and engaged in
the wholesale business. Two of the members of this firm
formed a partnership and engaged in a retail business.
Funds from the first partnership were withdrawn by the
second partnership and certain transactions were engaged
in between the two firms and at the instance of the members of the second firm which resulted very disastrously
to the first firm. Both firms subsequently became insolv-
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ent and it appeared that the firm of seven members was a
creditor of the firm of two in a large sum of money. Held:
That in the distribution of the respective partnership
estates in insolvency proceedings the assets of each partnership constitutes separate funds for its own creditors
and as to their respective creditors these two firms are to
be considered as distinct and separate entities. The Lower
Court had refused to allow the claim of the creditor firm
against the debtor firm because of its construction of a
certain agreement between the two firms which the court
deemed to make them both interested in the profits and
losses of the debtor firm. On appeal the Supreme Court
rejected this view saying, per Mitchell, J.:
o

"It is urged that the assignee, appellant, is not
entitled to prove against the fund until the accounts
between the partners of Wood, Brown & Co. shall have
been settled, and then only for the amount that may
be found due to the partners other than Wood and
Brown. In other words that Wood and Brown being
partners in the debtor firm cannot be creditors also of
that firm as against other creditors. But this argument
overlooks the effect of the insolvency of Wood, Brown
& Co. The moment that fact is ascertained the creditors acquire a right to all the assets of that firm, among
which undoubtedly is their claim against Haines &
Co. If Haines & Co. were solvent there could be no
question of the validity of this claim, although Brown
and Wood might be creditor partners; the right would
be in the creditors of Wood, Brown & Co. as a firm
without reference to the status of the individual partners in either firm among themselves. And the insolvency of Haines & Co. does not change the rights
of Wood, Brown & Co's creditors. As to their respective creditors the two firms are separate and distinct
entities, and the assets of each are a separate fund
for its own creditors, just as the firm assets and the
individual property of the partners are separate funds
for partnership and individual creditors in ordinary
cases, although the partners are equally debtors to
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both. Each class has a prior claim on its own fund,
and only a secondary or postponed claim on the other
after the latter's preferred creditors are satisfied."
The difference in result as it appears from this latter
case must be based upon the fraudulent acts of the second
firm in its conduct with the first firm and to the detriment
of the first firm and its creditors.
In Huffman Farm Company v. Rush, 173 Pa. 264, 1896,
it was held that under the Act of April 14, 1838, P. L. 457,
a partnership may bring an action against two joint purchasers of the firm's goods, although one of the purchasers
is a member of the partnership.
A. J. WHITE HUTTON

